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INSIDER TRADING AND ACCOUNTING
REFORM: THE COMSTOCK CASE
Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that major episodes of
insider trading and business fraud promote accounting reforms. During the 1860s and 1870s, the markets for Comstock mining shares
reeled from one scandal after another. Eventually these scandals
emerged as a leading political issue in California. The frauds contributed significantly to the passage of accounting and financial reporting reforms in 1880. The Comstock episode has implications for modern day instances of insider trading.

Major corporate business frauds have often stimulated the
development of modern financial accounting practices. Many
fraudulent schemes have been associated with insider trading
activities. The most important were the frauds of the 1920s that
led to the reforms of the 1930s. Yet this was neither the first
financial scandal, nor will it be the last. Daniel Drew, Jay Gould
and Ivar Kreuger became legends as a result of their ingenious
and ruthless intrigues, However, for shear audacity it is hard to
surpass events in San Francisco's stock exchanges during the
1860s and 1870s. This paper describes how California's stock
exchanges reeled from one insider trading scandal to another,
and how the California legislature enacted financial accounting
and disclosure reforms to protect the public.
The study of these early market abuses and the legislative
response is especially relevant today because of the many insider trading and S&L scandals of the past few years. Naturally
accountants worry about the impact of business frauds on the
economy and on the accounting profession. Yet, in the long r u n
that impact has not always been negative for the accounting
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profession. Flesher and Flesher [1986] showed the important
contributions made by Ivar Kreuger to the development of modern financial reporting. Under similar circumstances, the FASB
is currently crafting accounting reforms for the banking and
savings industries. The study of San Francisco's nineteenth century stock exchanges supports the hypothesis that accounting
reforms are a likely consequence of major business and securities frauds. An analysis of newspapers, corporate records, California statutes and an 1883 federal study of the Comstock are
used to support the above hypothesis.
This study also provides evidence which can be used to assess the merits of insider trading. There has been a vigorous
scholarly debate over insider trading since Manne defended the
practice in 1966 [Manne 1966a and 1966b; Brudney, 1979;
Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Manove, 1989; Moore, 1990; Shaw,
1990; Benabou and Laroque, 1992]. Manne argued that significant insider trading was a rare occurrence and that most opposition to insider trading was based on emotion rather than logic.
In his view, inside trading was generally a victimless crime. He
advocated inside trading as an effective means of encouraging
and compensating managers for their entrepreneurial activities.
Moore [1990] and Benabou and Laroque [1992] suggested that
inside trading promotes harmful business practices. Of special
interest to accountants is the motivation inside traders have to
manipulate the stock market by making false reports about
company operations. Manne [1966b, p. 149] doubted that insiders would lie very often about corporate affairs. However, on
the Comstock, insiders misled shareholders at almost every opportunity.
COMSTOCK MINING CORPORATIONS
The corporate form of business was first used extensively
on the West Coast in the early 1860s to finance the development
of the then recently discovered gold and silver bonanzas of the
Comstock Lode in Virginia City, Nevada. Corporations quickly
became the normal form of business for Comstock mines. When
California's first stock exchange was organized in 1862, it was
for the purpose of trading Nevada mining shares [Paul, 1947, p.
298]. From the earliest days, the shares of the Comstock mining
corporations were popular, but very risky, investments.
Because of its small size, the Comstock Lode could have
been efficiently developed by a handful of companies. Instead, it
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/4
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was divided among thirty-five to forty separate corporations
each with its own board of directors, president, accountant,
m i n e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , engineers, bookkeepers, timekeepers,
shafts, hoisting machinery, and grand offices in San Francisco.
This was a very inefficient system of management which was
financed by the Comstock's extraordinarily rich ore and by frequent stockholder assessments.
STOCK SPECULATION
The nature of the Comstock Lode encouraged stock speculation. The district's gold and silver appeared to be randomly
distributed along a narrow fault zone in bonanza deposits (i.e.
isolated masses of extremely high grade ore). It was impossible
to predict which corporation would discover the next bonanza.
Yet for twenty years, one bonanza after another was discovered.
Speculators purchased the stocks of apparently worthless mines
and willingly paid assessments for years because they hoped to
share in the next bonanza. The Comstock was more like a lottery t h a n a business opportunity. This market was dominated
by speculators; speculators are the one group that Manne
[1966a, pp. 114-115] felt were sure to lose when trading with
insiders. He compared it to gambling against someone who had
loaded dice.
Lotteries, of course, need strong promotional campaigns.
Mark Twain, a young Virginia City reporter in the early 1860s,
claimed that he and other reporters were bribed to inflate the
prices of mining shares. The following is Twain's colorful recollection [1871, p. 18]:
If the rock was moderately promising, we followed the
c u s t o m of the country, used strong adjectives and
frothed at the mouth as if a very marvel in silver discoveries had transpired. If the mine was a "developed"
one, and had no pay ore to show (and of course it
hadn't), we praised the tunnel; said it was one of the
most infatuating tunnels in the land; driveled and driveled about the tunnel till we ran entirely out of ecstasies—but never said a word about the rock.
While this story is amusing, it essentially involves bribing
financial reporters to dupe the public into buying shares at inflated prices. This is a type of fraudulent behavior that Manne
believed would rarely occur.
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A VOLATILE STOCK MARKET
Stock prices of Comstock Companies gyrated wildly as new
bonanzas were found and old ones were exhausted. For example, the stock of the Crown Point Mine rose from $3 per
share on Nov. 19, 1870 to $1,825 per share on May 5, 1872.
Between January and early May 1872, the market value of 150
mining corporations listed in San Francisco increased from $ 17
million to $81 million [Smith, 1943, pp. 129-133]. That bull
market collapsed during May 1872. The next boom [Lord, 1959,
p. 409] began late in 1874 and took the market to a value of over
$262 million. However, share prices plummeted during the
panic of January 1875. Mining stocks quickly recovered, but fell
once more when Virginia City was destroyed by the great fire of
October 1875. Soon prices rebounded, only to plunge in the
summer of 1876. The last significant bull market occurred in
1878. After that the Comstock began a rapid decline from which
it could not recover.
DECEPTION TOLERATED
During the 1860s and 1870s, many of the mines were controlled by stock manipulators (management rings) who devoted
more effort to rigging the market and defrauding stockholders
than to searching for ore. Comstock operating reports were often intentionally incomplete, misleading, inaccurate, or too late
to be of value [Lord, 1959, p. 286 and pp. 316-319]. Because of
these practices the mines were very poor investments for anyone, except for the members of the management rings.
Perhaps the shareholders tolerated deceptive financial reports because the lack of accurate information contributed to
the volatility of the market and thereby increased the opportunities for speculation. Most Comstock shareholders were gamblers, not investors. For fifteen years, the stock market had been
driven by the bonanza discoveries. Each new discovery initiated
a frenzy of stock trading. Anyone could become wealthy by
speculating in Comstocks, but very few speculators succeeded
without inside information. It was a lottery which was exciting
while it lasted.
Reform did not become an important public concern until
after the last great bonanza had been discovered and the market
for Comstock shares had begun its final decline. This occurred
during the second half of the 1870s. Only a few small bonanzas
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/4
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and lower grade ore deposits were discovered after that date.
For many years, the Comstock had contributed significantly to
the wealth of California. When the value of the mines collapsed
so did the wealth of many prominent Californians. As a result
the public finally became interested in curbing insider trading
and business fraud.
COMSTOCK ETHICS
The members of Comstock management rings did not hesitate to use inside information to take advantage of stockholders,
a n d occasionally they betrayed each other. The best known example of deception within a management group occurred in
1870, and involved John P. Jones and William Sharon [Smith,
1943, pp. 128-131]. Sharon founded the Union Mill and Mining
Company in 1867 and, within two years, he dominated the
Comstock. Jones was working for Sharon when late in 1870 he
discovered a large body of ore in the Crown Point Mine. Instead
of notifying Sharon, Jones and an associate, Alvinza Hayward,
quietly purchased a controlling interest in the mine. When Sharon learned what had happened, he considered battling for control of the board of trustees, but his chances did not look good
[Lord, 1959, pp. 282-284]. Instead of fighting, Sharon sold his
minority interest in the Crown Point to Jones and Hayward, and
at the same time purchased all of the shares they held in the
adjoining Belcher Mine.
Sharon gambled that the ore body would extend into the
property of the Belcher. The gamble paid off. The new bonanza
was one of the largest discoveries in Comstock history and
roughly 55 percent of the ore body lay within the Belcher
[Smith, 1943, p. 141]. Furthermore, Sharon purchased many
additional shares of the Belcher Mining Company from the
firm's treasury stock account. He paid only one dollar per share
which was less than one percent of their fair market value! It
was a c o m m o n practice for mine directors to purchase treasury
stock at bargain prices when the market began to rally [Smith,
1943, p. 130].
INSIDE INFORMATION
The shut-down was Virginia City's most distinctive form of
insider trading. Whenever a new section of the lode was being
explored, the miners were imprisoned underground. For many
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days, they would not be allowed to leave the mine and no visitors would be permitted to enter the mine. Thus, only the managers and their associates would possess inside information,
thus enabling them to complete their stock deals before releasing the miners [Gold Hill News, Feb. 15, 1869].
The shut-down was first employed by the management of
the Gould & Curry Mining Company in 1863 [Territorial Enterprise, Jan. 19, 1871]. This became quite a common practice in
Virginia City. For example, the newspapers reported the following cases: the Hale & Norcross Mine in January, 1868 [Territorial Enterprise, Jan. 11, 1868]; the Imperial-Empire Mine in February, 1869, [Gold Hill News, Feb. 15, 17-19, 1869], and the
Savage Mine in February, 1872 [Gold Hill News, Feb. 6 and 8,
1872]. On, January 19, 1871 the Territorial Enterprise reported
that three mines, the Crown Point, the Ophir, and the Yellow
Jacket, were shut-down at the same time.
Investors initially assumed that if a mine was shut-down a
discovery had been made. As a result, stock prices would rise
just because of the shut-down. Management rings observing this
behavior, began to shut-down worthless mines to rig stock
deals. In 1872, Alvinza Hayward and J. P. Jones shut-down the
Savage Mine and began leaking false reports of a great new
discovery. In San Francisco, the stock price soared from $62 to
$725 a share, while underground the miners relaxed because
there had been no discovery of any kind. Hayward and Jones
reportedly unloaded their shares in the Savage on their friends
[Smith, 1943, p. 88].
In order to benefit from inside information a b o u t the
mines, the management rings had to conceal their stock trades.
Complex systems of agents were developed to hide the identity
of traders. The real names of the owners of mining shares were
frequently not recorded in the stock ledgers. Leading investors
developed spy systems to obtain information. However, the average investor did not have these sources. Under these conditions, the proper decision for the uninformed outsider was not
to buy Comstock shares, but many continued to gamble in the
market. Perhaps the government inaction was due, in part to
the public's perception that outside investors were too foolish
when they persisted in speculating despite knowing that the
deck is stacked against them, and thus fools were unworthy of
sympathy or governmental protection.
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PRIVATE MILLS
Mines controlled by Sharon had all of their ore refined by
the Union Mill and Mining Company, which was privately
owned by Sharon and his close associates. The contracts which
Sharon negotiated for himself provided very generous profits
for the Union mills [Smith, 1943, p. 253]. Some mines controlled by Sharon even paid to have low-grade ore processed at
a loss in order to maintain the profits of his mills. Perhaps
because of the nature of these contracts, Sharon concealed his
interest in both the mines and the mills.
Every management ring which could afford to construct ore
mills followed Sharon's example. Many bonanzas failed to produce any dividends for investors because of this practice. For
example, the stockholders of the Justice Mine had the misfort u n e of discovering a b o n a n z a in 1875. However, milling
charges increased more rapidly than revenues and as the value
of the mine's production went up so did the assessments [San
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 8, 1879].
A FALSE ANNUAL REPORT
The leading management group of the 1870s was the Bonanza Firm, controlled by Mackay, Fair, Flood and O'Brien.
Late in 1873 they discovered a bonanza within the Consolidated
Virginia Mine which eventually yielded over $100 million in
gold and silver. Throughout 1874, no one knew the extent of the
big bonanza and most experts over estimated its size. However
by the end of 1875, the bottom of the bonanza had been reached
and the managers had sufficient data to estimate accurately the
size of the ore deposit. Yet, in the 1875 annual report to the
shareholders, the mine superintendent falsely claimed that the
ore body below the 1,550 foot level was twice as large as it was
known to be [Smith, 1943, pp. 194-195]. This could not have
been an honest mistake, bad estimate or a clerical error. Perhaps this misstatement gave the superintendent and his associates time to unload their shares on unsuspecting investors.
THEFT
Occasionally a management ring would simply loot a mining corporation. This happened to the Justice Mining Company
under the control of the firm of Schultz & Von Bargen during
1877. Their management style was akin to that of Blackbeard
Published by eGrove, 1993
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boarding a merchant ship. The stockholders brought legal action against Schultz & Von Bargen charging, a m o n g other
things, that they had pilfered $500,000 of the mine's operating
receipts and that an additional $250,000 had been stolen by the
sale of an ore deposit. Unfortunately for the stockholders,
Schultz maintained such poor accounting records that it was
impossible to verify the $500,000 claim. Regarding the other
allegation, George Schultz admitted that he had accepted a
$250,000 personal fee to negotiate the sale for $1 of a Justice
Mine ore deposit to the neighboring Alta Mining Company. The
managers of the Alta testified that they believed that they were
paying the $250,000 to the Justice Mining Company for the
mineral rights. However, the judge ruled that it was clearly a
bribe and, as such, it belonged to Schultz as personal income
[Daily Alta California, Mar. 16, 1880].
SALTING
One venerable means of manipulating stock prices is to salt
a worthless mine. All one needs to do is to buy several tons of
rich ore from a producing mine and to scatter the ore within the
property being promoted. Mark Twain tells how the North
Ophir was salted with melted silver coins. As a result of this
salting, it was the only Nevada mine ever to yield pure silver
nuggets. The experts were quite puzzled by this odd kind of ore
until someone discovered the letters "TED STATES OF" [Twain,
1871, pp. 21-23] stamped on one nugget. In January of 1880, the
Lady Bryan Mine was salted and the superintendent John Kelly
reported a discovery of $90 per ton ore [Engineering and Mining
Journal, Feb. 7, 1880, p. 105]. The stock rose from less than $1
per share to $4 per share before the hoax was revealed.
One wonders how many California legislators supported reform in 1880 because they had purchased Lady Bryan stock at
inflated prices or had invested in the Justice Mining Company.
REFORMS —
SAN FRANCISCO BOARD OF BROKERS
The San Francisco Board of Brokers proposed market reforms in 1870. Prior to this proposal, the mining stock market
had been depressed. The output of the Comstock declined from
$13.7 million in 1867 to $7.5 million in 1869. There had been no
significant discoveries for several years and the exhaustion of all
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the known deposits was clearly in sight by 1870 [Lord, 1959, pp.
263-264]. While the brokers could not stimulate the market by
discovering a bonanza, they hoped to generate more business by
reforming the market. On January 26, 1870, the San Francisco
Board of Brokers established a three-man committee to develop
solutions to the insider trading problem. This committee recommended that the state legislature require quarterly reports of
work done at each mine, reports of cash receipts and disbursements, and a detailed report of wages paid. The committee also
proposed that mine managers should be required to award milling contracts to the lowest bidder. However, the brokers did not
energetically lobby for these reforms and they did not even
adopt them as regulations for the exchange. As a consequence,
no action came from these recommendations. Eventually, the
discovery of the Crown Point bonanza late in 1870 brought investors back into the market without the need for reform.
REFORMS —
THE ACT OF 1874
The California legislature in 1874 enacted Senate Bill 393
(The O'Connor Bill), "an Act for the better protection of the
stockholders in corporations, formed under the laws of the state
of California, for the purpose of carrying on and conducting the
business of mining." The first section of this act [Thompson,
1918] required mining corporations to keep the books in accordance with the company's by-laws, but it did not specify what
should be stated in the by-laws. Were there mines that did not
keep any accounting records? The law also required the mines
to prepare semiannual statements of all business and financial
transactions, which was interpreted by the Comstock's leading
mines as a statement of cash receipts and disbursements. Investors holding stock of at least $500 par value could demand the
preparation of monthly balance sheets (probably cash flow
s t a t e m e n t s which were often called balance sheets on the
Comstock). The second section of this act obliged mine officers
to permit major shareholders (those owning at least $500 par
value) to enter and inspect the mine during all business hours.
This section was designed to eliminate the shut-in [San Francisco Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1874] and it may have represented a delayed response to the successful 1872 Savage Mine hoax perpetrated by Jones and Hayward.
Other reforms were considered and rejected by the legislaPublished by eGrove, 1993
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ture. The Duffy Bill would have prohibited margin sales of mining shares [Daily Alta California, Feb. 14, 1874] and also would
have prohibited sham sales of stock. The Gibbons Bill called for
the prohibition of short sales of stock [Daily Alta California, Feb.
15, 1874]. These latter bills did not pass. The newspapers generally supported the 1874 reforms, but the support was restrained.
Mine reform did not seem to be a big issue that year.
REFORMS —
THE FELTON BILLS OF 1880
From 1876 through 1880, many San Francisco and Sacramento newspapers were obsessed with the Comstock share market. Hundreds of editorials were written on the subjects of insider trading and stock fraud. The pressure on the legislature
must have been intense. The reforms of 1880 were almost certainly prompted by the crusade of the press.
In 1880, several bills, including some which were quite radical, were introduced in the California legislature. One bill would
have prohibited assessments on shares and another would have
prohibited all margin sales of stock. The legislature ultimately
rejected those proposals and instead adopted several reform
bills authored by assemblyman Charles Felton.
Assembly Bill 230 directed the mines to record the names of
the "real owners" in the stock books. This prohibited parking
transactions and should have made insider trades m u c h more
difficult to conceal. Another section of this act made it illegal to
"sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of" any portion of
the firm's mining grounds without the approval of at least twothirds of the voting stock. This section seems to be aimed directly at preventing a repetition of what happened at the Justice
Mine.
Felton's Assembly Bill 249 amended the Mining Act of 1874.
The Felton Act required mining corporations to keep a "complete" set of books and it now stated how these books should be
maintained. The books were required to show the sources of all
cash receipts and the object of all cash expenditures. Any shareholder was authorized to examine the books during normal
business hours and he had the right to be accompanied by an
expert (probably an accountant). Company officers were compelled to prepare monthly cash flow statements (called balance
sheets) which would disclose the source of all cash receipts and
to w h o m and for what purpose all disbursements were made.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/4

10

Insider
trading
and accounting
case
VentVent
and and
Birk: Birk:
Insider
Trading
and Accounting
Reform reform: The Comstock11
The officers were also obliged to report the current balance of
cash, bullion and all liabilities. There was no independent audit
requirement, but the financial statement must be sworn to under oath by the president and the secretary (accountant). Investors wishing to examine this statement needed to visit the corporate offices. The mine superintendent was directed to file
weekly statements of labor employed at the mine, of work done
at the mine, of ore extracted, of ore milled, and of all ore discoveries. All stockholders had the right to examine these reports.
Finally, every stockholder had the right to inspect the mine and
to be accompanied by a mining expert [Thompson, pp. 156158].
The accountants of the leading mines met at the offices of
the Consolidated Virginia Mining company to discuss the Felton
Acts and announced that they would obey all of the provisions,
except for the disclosure of the real owners of the mines which
they chose to ignore since there was no penalty for doing so
[Territorial Enterprise,
May 5, 1880]. The S a n F r a n c i s c o
Chronicle [May 5, 1880] reported that compliance with the
Felton Acts was quite good and that firms which failed to comply did so through ignorance rather than through intent.
FINANCIAL REPORTING ON THE COMSTOCK LODE
The financial reports of four leading Comstock mines have
been examined. These mines are the Hale & Norcross Silver
Mining Company, the Savage Mining Company, the Consolidated Virginia Mining Company, and the California Mining
Company. Generally, nineteenth century mining records are
rare. Fortunately there are two libraries with excellent collections of Comstock business records, the Huntington Library and
the University of Nevada-Reno Library. The examination revealed that the primary financial report on the Comstock was a
statement of cash flows. Balance sheets were included in the
early financial reports, but their importance declined during the
1870s. Comstock accountants lacked a clear understanding of
what a balance sheet should be and they sometimes called the
cash flow statements "balance sheets." There were no income
statements and little evidence of accrual accounting practices
such as depreciation or depletion.
The March 20, 1867 annual report of the Hale & Norcross
Silver Mining Company [Hale & Norcross, 1867] consisted of a
cash flow report and a statement of assets and liabilities. The
Published by eGrove, 1993
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cash flow statement summarized disbursements by objectives
such as mining, assaying and freight. The statement of assets
and liabilities was a balance sheet which used the expression
"Excess of Assets over Liabilities" in place of an owners' equity
section. The work in process inventory of partially processed
ore was recorded as an asset at its net realizable value. In
1870, the mine's Statement of Receipts and Disbursements
[Hale & Norcross, 1870] was much more detailed than it had
been three years earlier, but there were no other significant
changes.
The Savage Mining Company of Virginia City presented
three primary financial statements [Savage, 1868] for the year
ended July 11, 1868. These included a cash flow report, a statement of current assets and liabilities, and a statement of property, plant and equipment. The statement of current assets and
liabilities disclosed the mine's working capital position. It would
have provided information useful in assessing the need for
stockholder assessments or the likelihood of dividends. It was
balanced with the account Excess of Cash Assets over Liabilities. This firm's annual report also contained several auxiliary
schedules detailing production of precious metals, operating
costs, and the distribution of supply costs.
During the 1870s, the Consolidated Virginia Mining Company [Consolidated Virginia, 1876] and the California Mining
Company [California, 1876-1878], were the Comstock's leading
mines. These mines issued statements of cash disbursements
and receipts, which were called balance sheets. The structure of
their cash flow reports is very similar to the requirements of the
subsequently enacted Felton Bills. It would certainly have been
logical for Felton to have used the accounting and reporting
practices of the leading companies as a model for his legislation. The annual reports also contained a statement listing company assets which included supply inventories and property,
plant and equipment. Property, plant and equipment appear to
be recorded at unamortized historical cost. These mines did not
record the partially processed ore as an inventory as had the
Savage Mine and the Hale and Norcross Mine.
The Felton Acts made the cash-based financial reports of
the Comstock the standard for all California mining corporations. This very simple uniform system of reporting appears to
have been followed by California mining corporations until the
enactment of the federal income tax in 1913. During that pe-
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riod, California was one of the few important mining centers to
possess standardized accounts and reports.
COST BOOK ORIGINS
The Comstock accounting system may have been adapted
from the traditional cost book practices of Cornwall, England
[Lawn, 1901 and Williams, 1891]. The Cornish cost book system
was created in the reign of Edward I. This system combined
features of partnerships and corporations. The fundamental financial statement of these firms was the statement of accounts,
a cash flow report. Comstock reports are very similar to the
Cornish cost book practices. The prime difference appears to be
that the Comstock mines classified cash outflows by activity as
well as by payee. The statement of accounts of a leading Cornish cost book mine [Lawn, 1901, pp. 134-146] classified disbursements only by payee. At the same time as the development
of Comstock accounting, Cornish cost book practices were
transplanted to Australia as the no-liability system of mine organization [Godden and Robertson].
INSIDER TRADING
Insider trading was legal during the 1800s. As a consequence, it was widely and openly practiced in the Comstock
share markets. However, the insiders generally were not satisfied with the returns to be earned from employing their superior knowledge. They repeatedly defrauded investors by spreading false reports about the conditions at the mines. The untruthful information was spread by rumors, by managers expressing
expert opinions, and in published annual reports.
An infamous case of deception by inside traders was the
Savage Mine Deal of 1872. Hayward and Jones maintained a
shut-in at the mine while untrue rumors of a great discovery
circulated. The insiders knew that nothing had been discovered
and they must have been aware of the rumors. Why did they
continue to shut-in the mine? They did so to inflate the value of
the shares which the insiders were selling. Anyone who purchased Savage Mine shares was defrauded. However, this was
and continues to be a fairly safe form of fraud because of the
difficulty in identifying the source of the false rumors.
The California legislature did not consider the prohibition
of insider trading. Instead, the Felton laws were crafted to inPublished by eGrove, 1993
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hibit or prevent the specific frauds employed by the insiders.
The legislature required weekly operating reports from the mine
superintendents, and the stockholders were given the right to
inspect the mines. The mandated cash flow reports permitted
an assessment of the ability and honesty of the managers. Thus
the outside investors were given the tools to become informed
before buying or selling stock. If the outsiders still chose to
remain uninformed, then only they were to blame.
There are many types of inside traders, including corporate
directors, managers, lawyers, business reporters, investment
bankers and assorted friends and relatives. On the Comstock, a
ruthless parade of directors and managers enhanced their insider trading profits by withholding information and spreading
false reports. This type of market fraud is less c o m m o n today
because S.E.C. rule 10b-5 requires insider traders to disclose
material information or refrain from trading.
SUMMARY
The reform of California's stock markets in 1880 and the
concurrent mandating of published financial statements was a
political response to the brazen frauds associated with the
Comstock Lode. During the 1860s and 1870s California's stock
exchanges were rocked by one insider trading scandal after another. Those abuses met with public disfavor, but they were
tolerated as long as gold and silver continued to pour from the
mines. Eventually the last great bonanza was discovered and the
production of bullion declined rapidly. When that decline was
followed closely by hard times, the reform of the Comstock
share markets became one of California's leading political issues. In 1880, the California legislature enacted significant financial accounting and disclosure reforms as a primary means
of protecting the public. As a result of insider trading and
frauds, the Comstock Lode earned a very unsavory reputation
within the mining industry. On the other hand, California obtained a uniform system of mine reporting m a n y decades before
it would have, had it not been for these shady schemes.
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